

Message Text

PAGE 01 HONG K 05195 100358Z

21

ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ARA-16 EUR-25 NEA-14 RSC-01 IO-14 ISO-00

NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 OMB-01

ACDA-19 AID-20 DRC-01 /209 W
----- 100950

R 090815Z MAY 74 ZDK
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 675
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMCONSUL BOMBAY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMCONSUL CALCUTTA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
AMEMBASSY DACCA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL MADRAS
AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
SECRET

PAGE 02 HONG K 05195 100358Z

AMEMBASSY RANGOON
AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USLO PEKING
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN
CINCLANTFLT
CINCUSNAVEUR
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
COMIDEASTFOR

S E C R E T HONG KONG 5195

CINCPAC FOR POLAD; COMIDEAST FOR BT

E.O. 11652:GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, XO, IN, US
SUBJ: THE INDIAN OCEAN

REF: A) NEW DELHI 5616; B) BANGKOK 7092; C) JAKA
SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH, OF COURSE, THE PRC'S VIEWS ON THE INDIAN OCEAN SHOULD NOT BE OVERRIDING, ANY STATEMENT OF LONG RANGE INTENT AND RATIONAL FOR U.S. BEHAVIOR SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT PRC'S PROBABLY REACTIONS. PEKING WOULD: A) OBJECT STRONGLY TO ANY ASSOCIATION WITH THE BREZHNEV-GANDHI JOINT DECLARATION, WHICH TO THEM WOULD IMPLY U.S. ENDORSEMENT OF THE SOVIET COLLECTIVE SECURITY CONCEPT FOR ASIA; B) DISLIKE ANY NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD SEEM TO FURTHER U.S.-SOVIET DETENTE OR SANCTION EVEN REDUCED SUPERPOWER NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN; AND C) BE DISTURBED BY ANY U.S. MOVE WHICH WOULD APPEAR TO THE PRC AS IF THE U.S. WERE WITHDRAWING FROM THE AREA IN THE FACE OF SOVIET-INDIAN PRESSURE.

CHINA FAVORS A ZONE OF PEACE FORMULA WHICH GROWS FROM THE INITIATIVE OF THE LITTORAL STATES AND WHICH EMBODIES SWEEPING CONDITIONS WHICH WILL ACT ONLY AS A VAGUE RESITRAINT
SECRET

PAGE 03 HONG K 05195 100358Z

OR EMBARRASSMENT TO SUPERPOWER ACTIVITY. IF OUR INTENTION IS SIMPLY TO IMPROVE OUR PROPAGANDA POSITION WE MAY EXPECT INDIRECT BACKING FROM PEKING IN THAT THE PRC WILL ALSO ATTEMPT TO HEAD OFF NEGOTIATED, CONCRETE RESTRAINTS.

EMD SUMMARY.

1. PEKING'S PRESENT GOAL IS TO SEE THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT DOMINATE THE INDIAN OCEAN AND IN THIS THEY MUST RELY ON THE U.S. FUNDAMENTALLY, THE PRC ALSO WELCOMES U.S.-SOVIET CONTENTION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN OR ELSEWHERE AS STRATEGICALLY ADVANTAGEOUS. THUS THE CONTINUING NAVAL RACE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN IS NOT NECESSARILY UNWELCOME TO CHINA SO LONG AS IT IS KEPT BALANCED AND THE SOVIETS DO NOT RUN AWAY WITH THE GAME.

2. THIS ATTITUDE IS REFLECTED IN PEKING'S TREATMENT OF THE DIEGO GARCIA QUESTION. U.S. PLANS FOR THE ISLAND ARE PICTURED AS A REFLECTION OF SUPERPOWER CONTENTION BUT THE PRC ITSELF HAS ISSUED NO OFFICIAL STATEMENT CONDEMNING THE U.S. MOVE. PEKING MEDIA HAVE NOT EVEN CARRIED OFFICIAL AUSTRALIAN STATEMENTS ON THE SUBJECT. CHINESE REPORTING ON THIS ISSUE AS WELL AS ON THE OVERALL INDIAN OCEAN SITUATION HAS INDICATED THAT U.S. MOVES ARE IN REACTION TO A SOVIET BUILD-UP AND INTERESTINGLY THE CHINESE HAVE NOT INCLUDED SLBM OR INTERVENTIONIST CAPABILITIES AMONG U.S. OBJECTIVES. THE SOVIETS ON THE OTHER HAND ARE PICTURED AS ATTEMPTING TO CONTROL AND INTIMIDATE THE LITTORAL STATES.

3. AT BEST THE CHINESE MIGHT SIMPLY IGNORE ANY HIGH-LEVEL U.S. STATEMENT PROFESSING OUR PEACEFUL INTENTIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, BUT MORE LIKELY THEY WOULD BE INCLINED TO MOCK IT FOR DOCTRINAIRE REASONS. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE PRC WOULD NOT LIKE TO SEE THE U.S. MAKE A BETTER RATIONALIZATION OF ITS NEED TO COUNTER THE SOVIETS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN BECAUSE PEKING, WE SENSE, AGREES WITH AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS GAINING A PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE ON THIS ISSUE. IT WOULD BE INFURIATING TO THE CHINESE, HOWEVER, IF A U.S. STATEMENT ON THE INDIAN OCEAN IN AN EFFORT TO WIN POINTS WITH THE INDIANS TOOK THE FORM OF ASSOCIATING THE U.S. WITH THE BREZHNEV-GANDHI JOINT DECLARATION. THIS WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS BORDERING ON U.S. ENDORSEMENT OF THE SOVIET COLLECTIVE SECURITY CONCEPT FOR ASIA.

SECRET

PAGE 04 HONG K 05195 100358Z

4. PEKING ALSO WOULD NOT WELCOME ANY U.S. POLITICAL INITIATIVE AIMED AT NEGOTIATING FORMAL RESTRAINTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. LONGER-TERM, OF COURSE, THE CHINESE WANT BOTH SUPERPOWERS OUT OF THE INDIAN OCEAN BUT NOT IN A WAY WHICH FURTHERS US-SOVIET DETENTE OR TURNS THE AREA INTO INDIA'S OCEAN. CHINA WOULD CERTAINLY NOT ENDORSE OR LEND ITSELF TO ANY FORMAL ARRANGEMENTS SUCH AS ONES LIMITING NAVAL DAYS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND SO FORTH. THE CHINESE WOULD REJECT SUCH DETAILED PROPOSALS BECAUSE THEY WOULD IMPLY THE RIGHT OF THE SUPERPOWERS TO BE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND BECAUSE CHINA ITSELF IS UNLIKELY IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE TO BE EITHER WILLING OR ABLE TO PUT A FLEET INTO THE AREA. MOST IMPORTANTLY, SUCH AGREEMENTS--IN EFFECT AN INDIAN OCEAN MBFR--WOULD BE A MAJOR STEP FORWARD IN U.S.-SOVIET DISARMAMENT AND DETAXTE. CHINA WOULD NOT WELCOME THIS DEVELOPMENT.

5. AS ON MBFR, SALT AND OTHER U.S. -SOVIET DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS WE SHOULD, OF COURSE, NOT LET THE PRC DESIRE TO KEEP THE TIGERS GROWLING AND CIRCLING EACH OTHER AFFECT OUR DECISIONS ON WHETHER OR NOT TO BUILD UP OUR NAVAL CAPABILITIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN OR WHETHER SERIOUSLY TO SEEK FORMAL NAVAL RESTRAINTS IN THE AREA. THE INDIAN OCEAN, HOWEVER, IS CLOSER TO HOME FOR THE CHINESE AND WE

SHOULD BE SENSITIVE TO THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE SUPERPOWERS
SEEMING TO SET UP A CONDOMINIUM, DECIDING ON THE SIZE OF
FORCES IN THE AREA AND SO ON.

6. WHAT PEKING FAVORS IS A ZONE OF PEACE FORMULA FOR THE
INDIAN OCEAN SUCH AS PROPOSED BY SRI LANKA WHICH IS THE
INITIATIVE OF THE LITTORAL STATES AND WHICH EMBODIES
SWEEPING DEMANDS FOR THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL MILITARY FORCES.
SUPPORT FOR THIS SORT OF IOZP FORMULA PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY
FOR CHINA TO TAKE A FORWARD POSITION ON A DISARMAMENT ISSUE AND
TO UNDERSCORE ITS NON-SUPERPOWER STANCE WITHOUT AFFECTING ITS
OWN STRATEGIC POSITION. THE CHINESE, HOWEVER, EXPECT SUCH FORMULAS
TO HAVE LITTLE OTHER THAN PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT. THE MORE
SPECIFIC AND REALISTIC THE APPROACH TO SCALING DOWN THE
NAVAL RACE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, THE MORE DIFFICULTY CHINA
WILL HAVE WITH IT. THUS IF OUR INTENTION IS SIMPLY TO IM-
PROVE OUR PROPAGANDA POSITION ON THE IOZP ISSUE WHILE AVOID-
SECRET

PAGE 05 HONG K 05195 100358Z

ING STEPS WHICH WILL RESTRICT OUR FREEDOM OF ACTION, WE MAY
EXPECT INDIRECT BACKING FROM PEKING IN THAT IT WILL
ALSO ATTEMPT TO HEAD OFF NEGOTIATED CONCRETE RESTRAINTS.
CROSS

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 27 JUL 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, INDIAN OCEAN ZONE OF PEACE, MILITARY POLICIES, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, PUBLIC ATTITUDES, MILITARY BASES, COLLECTIVE SECURITY AGREEMENTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 09 MAY 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974HONGK05195
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D740114-0061
From: HONG KONG
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740588/abbrzatm.tel
Line Count: 190
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: A) NEW DELHI 5616; B) BANGKOK 7092; C) JAKA CROSS
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 02 APR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <02 APR 2002 by boyleja>; APPROVED <11 JUN 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: THE INDIAN OCEAN
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, XO, IN, US, CH
To: STATE INFO ABU DHABI
ADDIS ABABA
BANGKOK
BOMBAY
BRUSSELS
CALCUTTA

CANBERRA
COLOMBO
DACCA
DAR ES SALAAM
ISLAMABAD
JAKARTA
JIDDA
KABUL
KATHMANDU
KUALA LUMPUR
KUWAIT
LISBON
LONDON
MADRAS
MOGADISCIO
MOSCOW
NAIROBI
NEW DELHI
PARIS
PORT LOUIS
PRETORIA
RANGOON
SANAA
SINGAPORE
TANANARIVE
TEHRAN
TAIPEI
TOKYO
PEKING
GENEVA
USUN
CINCLANTFLT
CINCUSNAVEUR
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
COMIDEASTFOR
Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005